Analyzing the Implications of the Supreme Court’s Holding in \u3ci\u3eHerrera v. Wyoming\u3c/i\u3e by Rader, Andrew
American Indian Law Review 
Volume 44 Number 2 
2020 
Analyzing the Implications of the Supreme Court’s Holding in 
Herrera v. Wyoming 
Andrew Rader 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr 
 Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew Rader, Analyzing the Implications of the Supreme Court’s Holding in Herrera v. Wyoming, 44 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 403 (2020), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss2/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma 
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
 
403 
 
ANALYZING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT’S HOLDING IN HERRERA v. WYOMING 
Andrew Rader
*
 
Introduction 
The Crow Tribe has inhabited southern Montana and northern Wyoming 
for more than three centuries;
1
 Wyoming officially became a state in 1890, 
long after the Crow Tribe settled in the area.
2
 The Tribe’s settlement 
encompassed what is now known as the Bighorn National Forest, which is 
partly located in present-day Wyoming.
3
 Various territories officially 
declared statehood, and a recurring question became whether tribal treaty 
rights relating to the lands—now a part of the state—were preempted by the 
declaration of statehood.
4
 A common analysis in any treaty-rights case 
involves looking to congressional intent, as the legislature has the right to 
abrogate treaty rights in toto.
5
 Statehood preemption questions have arisen 
frequently in usufructuary rights cases—ones involving hunting and fishing 
rights.
6
 But that is not to say that the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
usufructuary rights cases cannot be applied to other, more significant treaty 
rights. Due in part to recent developments in case law and turnover on the 
Supreme Court, tribal treaty rights—not simply usufructuary ones—are 
currently the safest they have ever been. 
This Note will examine the line of cases involving statehood preemption 
of tribal treaty rights leading up to the recently decided Supreme Court case 
of Herrera v. Wyoming.
7
 Part I will lay out the background and history of 
cases grappling with statehood preemption, the doctrine’s treatment by the 
Supreme Court and other courts, and recent turnover on the Court in favor 
of the tribes. Part II will examine the recent case of Herrera v. Wyoming 
and the Supreme Court’s shift in favor of the tribes with its holding in that 
case.
8
 Part III will discuss counterarguments in support of statehood 
                                                                                                             
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).  
 2. Act of July 10, 1890 (Wyoming Statehood Act), ch. 664, 26 Stat. 222. 
 3. Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1692–93 (2019).  
 4. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 207 (1999). 
 5. Id.; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 511 (1896) (“That ‘a treaty may supersede a 
prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress supersede a prior treaty,’ is elementary.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686; Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172.  
 7. 139 S. Ct. 1686.  
 8. Id. 
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preemption and the implications moving forward post-Herrera. Finally, 
Part IV will conclude this Note and extrapolate on the broad reach of 
Herrera in other contexts based on the present makeup of the Supreme 
Court.  
I. History of Statehood Preemption and Recent 
Supreme Court Developments 
Statehood preemption has not been an issue in recent times because no 
territory has become a state since Hawaii joined the Union in August of 
1959.
9
 The issue still arises, however, when debating centuries-old tribal 
treaty rights.
10
 Throughout more than a century of jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has essentially done an about-face with its view on the 
doctrine.
11
 Differing views among the justices has led to many deep divides, 
at times along ideological lines. Overall, the case law has been developing 
for over a century. 
A. Ward v. Race Horse and the Early Supreme Court View 
The Supreme Court addressed a statehood preemption argument in the 
early case of Ward v. Race Horse in 1896.
12
 The facts before the Court in 
Race Horse were strikingly similar to those found in Herrera.
13
 Race Horse 
involved the Bannock Tribe of Indians, another tribe with land in present-
day Wyoming, and the Tribe’s treaty with the United States.
14
 Within this 
treaty, article 4 provided, in part, the following language: “[B]ut they shall 
have the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long 
as game may be found thereon, and so long as peace subsists among the 
whites and Indians on the borders of the hunting districts.”
15
 The crux of 
this case was whether Wyoming’s statehood preempted the Bannock 
Tribe’s treaty right to hunt on the “unoccupied lands of the United States,” 
which included the Bighorn National Forest.
16
 Race Horse, a member of the 
Bannock Tribe, was arrested for violating a state gaming law after killing 
seven elk in Wyoming; he argued that he was entitled to hunt, 
                                                                                                             
 9. See Proclamation No. 3309, 24 Fed. Reg. 6868 (1959). 
 10. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172.  
 11. Compare Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896), with Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686. 
 12. 163 U.S. 504.  
 13. See infra text accompanying note numbers 81–93. 
 14. See Treaty with the Eastern Band Shoshoni and Bannock (Shoshone-Bannock 
Treaty), July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673.  
 15. Id. art. 4, quoted in Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16. Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 507. 
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notwithstanding the law, as a member of the Tribe and in light of the clear 
treaty language.
17
 The State of Wyoming countered that its admittance as a 
state to the Union abrogated the Shoshone-Bannock Treaty’s provision to 
hunt freely on said lands.
18
 The Supreme Court thus had to analyze whether 
the treaty remained valid. 
In stark contrast to the eventual outcome in Herrera in 2019, the Court in 
Race Horse concluded that the Shoshone-Bannock Treaty right to hunt was 
extinguished when Wyoming officially became a state.
19
 Justice White, 
writing for the majority, first reasoned that states are admitted to the Union 
on an “equal footing” with existing states.
20
 The equal-footing doctrine 
dictates that “all States enter the Union with the full panoply of powers 
enjoyed by the original 13 States at the adoption of the Constitution.”
21
 The 
State therefore could not be burdened by treaties that conflicted with 
Wyoming’s “vested” power “to regulate the killing of game within [its] 
borders.”
22
 Moreover, the majority deemed the treaty’s hunting rights 
provision “essentially perishable and intended to be of limited duration.”
23
 
The Court criticized the defendant’s argument that the terms of the treaty 
were “perpetual,” and instead opted to assume the right was “temporary and 
precarious.”
24
 The Court interpreted the Tribe’s argument as “distorting the 
words of [the] treaty” and ignoring “the express will of Congress” since the 
treaty would be in direct conflict with Wyoming’s ability to govern itself.
25
  
The dissent, on the other hand, penned by Justice Henry Brown, came to 
the opposite conclusion, reasoning that “abrogation of a public treaty ought 
not to be inferred from doubtful language, but that the intention of congress 
to repudiate its obligation ought clearly to appear.”
26
 Justice Brown took a 
practical approach to interpreting the treaty. He stated that Congress surely 
anticipated Wyoming would become a state, but instead of reserving the 
Bannock Tribe’s right to hunt until statehood, Congress instead reserved the 
hunting rights “so long as game may be found upon the lands, and so long 
                                                                                                             
 17. In re Race Horse, 70 F. 598, 599–600 (Cir. Ct. D. Wyo. 1895), rev’d sub nom. Ward 
v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).  
 18. Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 514. 
 19. Id. at 516.  
 20. Id. at 509–14 (citing Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845)). 
 21. Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1705 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 22. Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 509–14 (citing Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 
How.) 212 (1845)).  
 23. Id. at 515.  
 24. Id. at 510. 
 25. Id. at 516. 
 26. Id. at 517 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
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as peace should subsist on the borders of the hunting districts.”
27
 In his final 
remarks, Justice Brown expressed his uneasiness toward the majority’s 
holding that the mere admission of a state to the union can constructively 
occupy land which is, in fact, unoccupied, for the purposes of tribal treaty 
rights.
28
 
In the case of Herrera v. Wyoming, the State of Wyoming relied heavily 
on the case of Race Horse, presumably because the facts before the Herrera 
Court were, for all intents and purposes, exactly the same as the facts in 
Race Horse.
29
 Additionally, the State of Wyoming pointed to the holding 
and reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis in 
Herrera.
30
 
B. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis and the Tenth Circuit’s Continuation of 
Race Horse 
The Tenth Circuit reinforced the power of statehood preemption in the 
1990s in the case of Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis.
31
 The Repsis decision 
would become a deeply disputed case between the majority and the dissent 
in Herrera.
32
 In Repsis, Thomas L. Ten Bear was issued a citation by game 
warden Chuck Repsis for killing elk in the Bighorn National Forest without 
a valid hunting license.
33
 Following a successful prosecution and 
conviction, Ten Bear challenged the ruling, citing the exact treaty at issue in 
Herrera.
34
 In representing Ten Bear, the Crow Tribe sought both 
declaratory relief and an injunction against the State of Wyoming for 
violating the 1868 Treaty.
35
 Before arriving at the Tenth Circuit, the case 
was heard by the Wyoming federal district court, which dismissed the 
action, citing Race Horse as binding authority that the Crow Tribe’s 
hunting right had been abrogated.
36
 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed 
the lower court’s dismissal, reasoning that the Crow Tribe’s argument was 
                                                                                                             
 27. Id. at 518 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. at 520 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
 29. Compare discussion of Race Horse supra text accompanying notes 12–18 with 
discussion of Herrera infra text accompanying notes 83–91.  
 30. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis (Repsis II), 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See infra Sections II.C–D. 
 33. Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 985. 
 34. Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow Indians, art. IV, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649.  
 35. Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 986.  
 36. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis (Repsis I), 866 F. Supp. 520, 522–25 (D. Wyo. 
1994).  
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too similar to the one espoused by the Bannock Tribe in Race Horse;
37
 the 
hunting right was preempted by statehood.
38
 To conclude, the Tenth Circuit, 
while admonishing the lower court’s reluctance to follow Race Horse, 
found Justice White’s majority opinion “compelling, well-reasoned, and 
persuasive.”
39
 “Race Horse is alive and well,” the Court professed.
40
  
Senior Circuit Judge Barrett’s opinion includes a thorough examination 
of the holding and reasoning in Race Horse to elaborate on the decision’s 
alleged persuasiveness.
41
 Immediately following is a review of subsequent 
cases relied on by the Crow Tribe; the Tribe argued that the holding in Race 
Horse had been essentially overruled by “a string of cases upholding 
federal authority to regulate wildlife notwithstanding claims of interference 
with state sovereignty.”
42
 The Court expressly rejected this argument, 
finding that “absent any conflict between federal and state authority to 
regulate the taking of game, the state retains the authority, even over federal 
lands within its borders.”
43
 The fact that the Repsis Court based its 
reasoning on two separate, independent theories—statehood preemption 
and conservation rights—led to a bitter disagreement between the majority 
and dissent in Herrera v. Wyoming.
44
 
In a final effort to convince the Tenth Circuit of its right under the treaty, 
the Crow Tribe contended that newly reformed canons of construction post-
Race Horse should persuade the court to construe the treaty language in its 
favor.
45
 The Tenth Circuit quickly dismissed this argument, citing 
Worcester v. Georgia,
46
 and pointing out that these canons of construction 
were well-known by the Court in Race Horse.
47
 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Repsis solidified the idea that Race 
Horse was still relevant when interpreting tribal treaty language. But four 
years later, the Supreme Court delivered a decision with strong implications 
that Race Horse was not the controlling law that it once was.  
  
                                                                                                             
 37. Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 988.  
 38. Id. at 992 (citing Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 514 (1896)).  
 39. Id. at 994. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 988–89.  
 42. Id. at 989.  
 43. Id. at 990 (citing Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976)).  
 44. See infra Sections II.C–D. 
 45. Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 992.  
 46. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832).  
 47. Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 992.  
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C. The Court’s About-Face on Statehood Preemption in Minnesota v. Mille 
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians 
The Supreme Court sought to end the reign of the Race Horse decision 
when it decided Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians
48
 in 
1999. Another treaty dispute, the Mille Lacs decision involved the granting 
of hunting rights, among other things, to the Chippewa Indians in exchange 
for their lands in present-day Wisconsin and Minnesota.
49
 After Minnesota 
was established as the thirty-second state in the Union,
50
 the Chippewa 
Tribe sought a declaration from the courts that its usufructuary rights in the 
area were retained.
51
 In a harsh rebuke of the Race Horse decision, both the 
district court and the Eighth Circuit held that the Chippewa Tribe’s hunting 
rights under the treaty were not abrogated by Minnesota’s statehood.
52
 The 
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari. In a 5-4 opinion authored 
by Justice O’Connor, the Supreme Court held in favor of the Tribe; a 
stunning reversal, at least on its face, to years of precedent to the contrary.
53
 
While on the surface this decision looks like an explicit overturning of 
Race Horse, the Court tried instead to distinguish its decision.
54
 
Specifically, Justice O’Connor reasoned that Minnesota’s statehood by 
itself did not abrogate the Tribe’s treaty right.
55
 If the treaty right were to 
ever be abrogated, the Court held, Congress would need to express a clear 
intent to do so.
56
 Using this methodology, the Chippewa Tribe’s treaty 
rights were retained absent any clear intent of Congress to abrogate them.
57
  
The State of Minnesota relied on the holding in Race Horse.
58
 The Court 
responded to that argument in a straightforward manner: “Race Horse 
rested on a false premise.”
59
 Citing to a few subsequent cases, the Court 
found that tribal hunting rights “are not irreconcilable with a State’s 
                                                                                                             
 48. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).  
 49. Id. at 175–76.  
 50. Act of May 11, 1858, ch. 31, 11 Stat. 285. 
 51. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 185.  
 52. Id. at 187.  
 53. Id. at 176.  
 54. Id. at 203–08. This attempt to distinguish would ultimately lead to the battle over 
issue preclusion between the majority and dissent in Herrera. 
 55. Id. at 202–03. 
 56. Id. at 202 (citing United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738–40 (1986)).  
 57. Id. at 203.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 204. 
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sovereignty over the natural resources in the State.”
60
 In other words, both 
rights can coexist.
61
 The Court pointed out, however, that the Crow Tribe’s 
usufructuary rights in Race Horse conflicted with Wyoming’s regulation of 
natural resources, and therefore were an “impairment of Wyoming’s 
sovereignty.”
62
 As applied to the Chippewa Tribe, the usufructuary rights 
were retained because Minnesota’s statehood did not affect them, and 
Congress had not expressed a clear intent to abrogate them.
63
 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist—joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Thomas—delivered a scathing dissenting opinion in Mille Lacs.
64
 Amid 
other disagreements with the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist expressed 
his “strong disagreement” with the Court’s holding that Minnesota’s 
admission to the Union did not abrogate the Chippewa Tribe’s hunting 
rights.
65
 Rehnquist dubbed the Court’s treatment of Race Horse 
“jurisprudential legerdemain,” or sleight of hand, because it seemed to 
overrule the decision while claiming to be distinguishable.
66
 The dissent 
was especially confused by the fact that the treaty language in the 
Chippewa treaty was even more “temporary and precarious” than the 
language in the Crow treaty at issue in Race Horse.
67
 In the end, the 
dissenters believed the equal-footing doctrine recognized by the Race 
Horse Court should have carried the day, but it was instead set aside by the 
majority.
68
 
D. Turnover on the Supreme Court in Favor of the Tribes 
Following a close 5-4 decision in Mille Lacs, justices on the bench 
favoring tribal treaty rights were only a simple majority. Of the five justices 
that made up the majority in Mille Lacs, only two remain on the Court 
today—Justices Ginsburg and Breyer; and of the dissenters, only Justice 
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. (citing Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 
443 U.S. 658 (1979); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975)).  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 208.  
 64. Id. at 208–20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent 
but joined Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion as well. 
 65. Id. at 217 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 66. Id. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 67. Id. at 219–20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 
504, 515 (1896)). The qualifying language in the Chippewa treaty guaranteed hunting rights 
“during the pleasure of the President.”  
 68. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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Thomas remains.
69
 Apart from Justice O’Connor, who was considered part 
of the conservative wing during her tenure on the bench,
70
 the 5-4 split in 
Mille Lacs was along ideological lines. The swing vote of Justice O’Connor 
in favor of the Tribes was presumably unexpected since she was much more 
likely to vote with the conservative bloc than the liberal bloc of justices 
throughout her time on the Court.
71
 The next time the tribal treaty issue 
would be construed in the same context, the makeup of the Court would be 
drastically different.  
Since President Donald Trump was elected in 2016, he has had the 
opportunity to appoint two justices to the Supreme Court—Justices Neil 
Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh. Because they were appointed by a 
Republican president, both junior justices on the Court are considered more 
conservative than liberal so far in their tenure. But their minimal time on 
the Court begs the question of how both Gorsuch and Kavanaugh will vote 
in tribal cases. Because the makeup of the Court is entirely different from 
when Mille Lacs was decided, mere inferences could only be made about 
the voting habits of the bench in tribal treaty cases in 2019.  
Prior to Herrera v. Wyoming, the March 2019 decision of Washington 
State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.
72
 shed some light on the 
new justices’ inclinations in tribal treaty cases. Cougar Den involved a 
dispute over a Washington state gasoline transportation tax enforced against 
the Yakama Tribe.
73
 The actual text of the treaty gave members of the 
Yakama Tribe “the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to 
travel upon all public highways.”
74
 In a 5-4 decision, Justice Gorsuch sided 
with the liberal wing of justices, authoring a concurring opinion joined by 
Justice Ginsburg; Justice Kavanaugh joined the conservative wing and 
authored his own dissenting opinion.
75
 Justice Gorsuch explained that the 
                                                                                                             
 69. Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/ 
biographies.aspx (last visited Sep. 29, 2019).  
 70. See JAN CRAWFORD GREENBERG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 68 (2007) (noting that 
O’Connor voted with Chief Justice Rehnquist, an outspoken conservative, in 87% of his 
opinions during her first three years on the Court).  
 71. See Robert J. Jackson & Thiruvendran Vignarajah, Nine Justices, Ten Years: A 
Statistical Retrospective, 118 HARV. L. REV. 510, 512 (2004).  
 72. 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019).  
 73. Id. at 1006–07.  
 74. Treaty with the Yakama Nation, art. 3, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951, quoted in Cougar 
Den, 139 S. Ct. at 1007. 
 75. Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. at 1016–21 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at 1026–29 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The majority included Associate Justices Gorsuch, Ginsburg, 
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Court’s objective was to interpret the language in a way “most consistent 
with the treaty’s original meaning.”
76
 In light of that objective, Gorsuch 
reasoned that the “factual findings . . . require[d] a ruling for the 
Yakamas.”
77
 Justice Kavanaugh, on the other hand, sided with the State’s 
view that the treaty language was best interpreted to give the Yakama Tribe 
the right to travel on “public highways on equal terms with other U.S. 
citizens.”
78
  
Cougar Den was a treaty interpretation case much like the past-discussed 
cases of Race Horse, Mille Lacs, and Repsis. The resulting votes in Cougar 
Den painted a picture of how the current Supreme Court would approach 
these cases. Moving forward, the result in Cougar Den called into question 
the outcome of the later decision of Herrera v. Wyoming, which this Note 
will now examine. 
II. The Supreme Court’s Affirmance of Mille Lacs in Herrera v. Wyoming 
The century-and-a-half development of statehood preemption and its 
place in the Supreme Court’s view would come to the forefront in 2019 in 
the case of Herrera v. Wyoming.
79
 After Justice Gorsuch sided with the 
liberal wing on the Native American rights issue in Cougar Den, the Crow 
Tribe was hopeful that his support would continue into the usufructuary 
rights arena.
80
 
A. Facts of the Case 
The Crow Tribe was originally nomadic, inhabiting parts of Canada 
before making their way south to what is now southern Montana and 
northern Wyoming.
81
 As such, the Tribe has always hunted game for 
subsistence.
82
 Due to the increase in American settlers migrating west for 
new lands, the lands occupied by the Crow Tribe became the property of 
                                                                                                             
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer; the dissent included Associate Justices Alito, Thomas, and 
Kavanaugh, as well as Chief Justice Roberts. 
 76. Id. at 1016 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 77. Id. at 1017 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 78. Id. at 1026 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  
 79. 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019).  
 80. See Nick Martin, Gorsuch Sides with Liberal Justices to Spoil Washington’s Attempt 
to Rewrite Tribal Law, SPLINTER (Mar. 20, 2019, 10:29 AM), https://splinternews.com/ 
gorsuch-sides-with-liberal-justices-to-spoil-washington-1833433274.  
 81. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547–48 (1981).  
 82. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1692 (citing JOSEPH M. CROW, FROM THE HEART OF THE 
CROW COUNTRY: THE CROW INDIANS’ OWN STORIES 4–5, 8 (1992)). 
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the United States after a series of treaties. The First Treaty of Fort Laramie 
of 1851 (1851 Treaty) was between the Tribe and the United States and 
designated around thirty-eight million acres as Crow territory.
83
 The 1851 
Treaty clarified that the Tribe “did not ‘surrender the privilege of hunting, 
fishing, or passing over’ any of the lands [at issue].”
84
 The Second Treaty of 
Fort Laramie of 1868 (1868 Treaty) reduced the Crow reservation to around 
eight million acres and included a piece of the Big Horn River.
85
 Many 
more acts of Congress reduced the Tribe’s acreage further to around 2.3 
million acres,
86
 but, at issue in Herrera was the 1868 Treaty.
87
 
The treaty language in question in Herrera was almost verbatim the 
language in the treaty in Race Horse but with a different tribe. Article 4 of 
the 1868 Treaty provided that “[t]he Indians . . . shall have the right to hunt 
on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found 
thereon, and as long as peace subsists among the whites and Indians on the 
borders of the hunting districts.”
88
 A few months after the 1868 Treaty was 
signed, Wyoming became a territory and twenty-two years later was 
admitted to the Union as the forty-fourth state.
89
 Additionally, in 1897, 
President Grover Cleveland “reserved from entry or settlement” lands in 
Wyoming ceded by the Crow Tribe that became known as the Bighorn 
National Forest.
90
 
Clayvin Herrera is a member of the Crow Tribe and, in 2014, he pursued 
a herd of elk across the boundary of the Crow reservation into the Bighorn 
National Forest.
91
 Herrera and fellow tribal members successfully killed a 
few elk and returned to the reservation with the meat.
92
 Subsequently, 
                                                                                                             
 83. Montana, 450 U.S. at 547–48 (citing Treaty of Fort Laramie with Sioux, Etc., art. 5, 
Sept. 17, 1851, 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 594 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904)). 
 84. Id. at 548 (quoting Treaty of Fort Laramie with Sioux, Etc., supra note 83, art. 5). 
 85. Id. (citing Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow Indians, supra note 34, art. 2). 
 86. Id. (citing Act of Apr. 11, 1882, ch. 74, 22 Stat. 42; Act of Mar. 5, 1891, § 31, ch. 
543, 26 Stat. 989, 1039–40; Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1624, 33 Stat. 352; Act of Aug. 31, 
1937, ch. 890, 50 Stat. 884). 
 87. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1691 (citing Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow Indians, 
supra note 34). 
 88. Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow Indians, supra note 34, art. 4, quoted in 
Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1693.  
 89. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1693 (citing Act of July 10, 1890 (Wyoming Statehood Act), 
ch. 664, 26 Stat. 222).  
 90. Presidential Proclamation No. 30, 29 Stat. 909 (1897), quoted in Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 
at 1693.  
 91. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1693.  
 92. Id.  
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Herrera was arrested by Wyoming authorities for hunting elk out of season 
and, thus, violating state law.
93
  
B. Procedural Posture 
At the state trial court level, Herrera filed a motion to dismiss the case, 
citing the clear language in the 1868 Treaty that gave him the right to hunt 
within the boundaries of the Bighorn National Forest.
94
 The court denied 
the motion to dismiss and allowed the case to go to trial.
95
 Herrera’s 
defensive use of the treaty language was not permitted, and a jury convicted 
him of hunting elk out of season.
96
  
Herrera then appealed to the state appellate court, whose question on 
appeal was “whether the Crow Tribe’s off-reservation hunting right was 
still valid.”
97
 Herrera argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians had implicitly 
overruled the previous holding in Ward v. Race Horse, and, therefore, 
undermined the reasoning in the Tenth Circuit’s Crow Tribe of Indians v. 
Repsis decision.
98
 The state appellate court instead decided that the Repsis 
decision was not undermined because Mille Lacs had not overruled Race 
Horse.
99
 Therefore, according to the court, the treaty right under the 1868 
Treaty “expired upon Wyoming’s statehood.”
100
 As an alternative ground 
for dismissing Herrera’s claim, the appellate court also held that issue 
preclusion was merited based on the judgment in Repsis because Herrera is 
a member of the Crow Tribe, which litigated the Repsis case “on behalf of 
itself and its members.”
101
 Lastly, the court, again relying on Repsis, 
concluded that the land on which Herrera was hunting was “occupied” 
within the meaning of the treaty language when the Bighorn National 
Forest was established.
102
 
After the Wyoming Supreme Court denied Herrera’s petition for review 
of the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
103
 
                                                                                                             
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1693–94.  
 99. Id. at 1694.  
 100. Id. (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App-31 to App-34, Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 
1686 (No. 2016-242)). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103. Id. 
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C. Justice Sotomayor’s Majority Opinion 
In a 5-4 decision in favor of the Crow Tribe, Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, 
and Gorsuch.
104
 The opinion addressed two main issues: (1) whether the 
Crow Tribe’s hunting rights under the 1868 Treaty remained valid; and (2) 
even if the treaty right was valid, whether the protection extends into the 
Bighorn National Forest if it was “occupied.”
105
 The majority also briefly 
addressed the problem of issue preclusion, which is discussed below in 
Section II.D.  
On the first point, the majority in Herrera concluded that the Crow 
Tribe’s hunting rights under the treaty remained valid, even after Wyoming 
became a state.
106
 This conclusion was predominantly based on the Court’s 
holding twenty years prior in Mille Lacs, which effectively overruled Race 
Horse, even though it had not done so explicitly.
107
 In so holding, the 
majority rejected the “equal footing” doctrine relied on in Race Horse, 
much like the Mille Lacs Court had done.
108
 Instead of adopting the “equal 
footing” doctrine, the majority in Herrera, again much like the Mille Lacs 
Court, decided that in order for a tribal treaty right to be deemed abrogated, 
Congress “must clearly express” an intent to do so.
109
 In other words, the 
question is “whether Congress has expressly abrogated an Indian treaty 
right or whether a termination point identified in the treaty itself has been 
satisfied.”
110
 
Applying that analysis to the Crow Tribe’s 1868 Treaty, the majority 
found that Wyoming’s declaration of statehood, without more, did not 
abrogate the tribal treaty right.
111
 According to Justice Sotomayor, this part 
of the analysis was simple because Congress never expressed an intent to 
abrogate Indian treaty rights when admitting Wyoming to the Union.
112
 The 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 1694, 1700 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 106. Id. at 1694.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 1695 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109. Id. at 1696 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1698.  
 112. Id. (“There must be ‘clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict 
between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose 
to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.’” (quoting Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202–03 (1999) (quoting in turn United States v. Dion, 476 
U.S. 734, 740 (1986))).  
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Court then addressed the alternative grounds for the holding in Race Horse, 
namely, whether the treaty rights were never meant to be perpetual, but 
rather “temporary and precarious.”
113
 The Court found no such evidence 
that the treaty rights at issue were meant to expire at statehood, again 
applying the congressional intent test set forth in Mille Lacs.
114
 “Indian 
treaties,” the Court stated, “‘must be interpreted in light of the parties’ 
intentions, with any ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians.’”
115
 The 
State of Wyoming had also argued that even under the Mille Lacs decision 
it should prevail because statehood, as a practical matter, “marked the 
arrival of ‘civilization’ in the Wyoming Territory and thus rendered all the 
lands in the State occupied.”
116
 The Court rejected this alternative 
argument, however, reasoning that “statehood as a proxy for occupation” 
goes against the Court’s clear instruction that “treaty-protected rights ‘are 
not impliedly terminated upon statehood.’”
117
 
On the second point, the majority in Herrera held that the establishment 
of Bighorn National Forest did not categorically “occupy” the land within 
the meaning of the 1868 Treaty.
118
 The majority relied on case law stating 
that treaty terms should be construed “as they would naturally be 
understood by the Indians.”
119
 Thus, the Indians’ understanding of the word 
“unoccupied” would “denote an area free of residence or settlement by non-
Indians.”
120
 Justice Sotomayor broke down the treaty and referred to the 
word choice and syntax of various other articles of the 1868 Treaty to 
bolster her conclusion. Citing articles 2 and 4, the opinion notes that the 
word “occupation” was used by the drafters to also refer to the Tribe’s 
occupation within the reservation—supporting the argument that 
occupation and residence are synonymous.
121
 Additionally, the treaty refers 
to the Tribe members as “‘settlers’ on the new reservation.”
122
 
Commissioner Taylor, a key player in the treaty negotiations, even 
                                                                                                             
 113. See Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 515 (1896). 
 114. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1699.  
 115. Id. (quoting Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 206).  
 116. Id. at 1699–1700 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 48, Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. 
Ct. 1686 (2019) (No. 17-532)). 
 117. Id. at 1700 (quoting Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 207).  
 118. Id. at 1700–01.  
 119. Id. at 1701 (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing 
Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1701–02 (citing Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow Indians, supra note 34, 
arts. 2, 4).  
 122. Id. at 1701. 
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commented that “white people [were] rapidly increasing and . . . occupying 
all the valuable lands.”
123
 
After citing such compelling parallels, among other things, the majority 
concluded it was “clear that President Cleveland’s proclamation creating 
Bighorn National Forest did not ‘occupy’ that area within the treaty’s 
meaning.”
124
 According to the majority, the President’s proclamation 
language “made Bighorn National Forest more hospitable, not less, to the 
Crow Tribe’s exercise of the 1868 Treaty right.”
125
 Overall, the majority 
found Wyoming’s arguments unpersuasive; these included citing to mining 
and logging activity on the land and federal regulation of the area as enough 
to render the area “occupied.”
126
 Taking the stance that the treaty should be 
understood as the Tribe understood it, the Court declared Bighorn National 
Forest unoccupied when considering the Crow Tribe’s usufructuary rights 
laid out in the 1868 Treaty.
127
 
The majority rounded out its opinion with a few limitations. First was 
that the entirety of the Bighorn forestland was not necessarily 
“unoccupied,” and that Wyoming could prove on remand that the specific 
place in which Herrera hunted was occupied.
128
 At this stage, the State had 
failed to carry that burden of proof. Second was that the argument 
concerning the State’s ability to regulate the area was impeded by the 
Tribe’s hunting right was not raised at the appellate level, and thus would 
not be analyzed by the Supreme Court.
129
 This point could be proven by the 
State on remand as well. 
D. Justice Alito’s Dissenting Opinion and the Dispute of Issue Preclusion 
Justice Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice 
Roberts, and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined.
130
 While the dissent 
ultimately disagreed with the majority’s treaty interpretation methodology, 
calling it “debatable,”
131
 the predominant disagreement concerned the 
doctrine of issue preclusion.
132
 The dissent contended that, based on the 
                                                                                                             
 123. Id. at 1702 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).  
 124. Id. “The President ‘reserved’ the lands ‘from entry or settlement.’” (quoting 
Presidential Proclamation No. 30, 29 Stat. 909). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1702–03.  
 127. Id. at 1703.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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 132. Id. at 1703–13 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Tenth Circuit’s holding in Crow of Tribe Indians v. Repsis, Herrera was 
precluded from bringing the action against the State, and the Repsis 
decision controlled.
133
 
Fundamentally, the majority and dissent disagreed about Minnesota v. 
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians and its effect on the legal context 
involved in these many similar cases.
134
 The majority reasoned that the 
legal context had changed based on the decision in Mille Lacs, and 
therefore warranted invoking an exception to issue preclusion in Herrera.
135
 
While the dissent recognized the existence of the change-in-law exception, 
Justice Alito warned that “caution is in order” when applying it, so as to 
protect the doctrine of issue preclusion.
136
 In other words, whether Ward v. 
Race Horse was overturned in Mille Lacs was a question of degree. 
This question of degree can be broken down into the two premises upon 
which Race Horse relied: (1) the equal-footing doctrine, and (2) 
congressional intent through statehood preemption.
137
 Justice Alito writes 
that while it may be clear that the Mille Lacs majority repudiated the equal-
footing rationale of Race Horse, “it is by no means clear that Mille Lacs 
also rejected the second ground.”
138
 Whether sufficient congressional intent 
is present to relinquish treaty rights, Justice Alito contends, is a fact-
specific question that must be analyzed in the context of the specific 
treaty.
139
 
With this approach in mind, the dissent concluded that Race Horse had 
not been sufficiently overruled in Mille Lacs, and therefore, the legal 
context had not changed enough to warrant any exception to the doctrine of 
issue preclusion.
140
 In other words, “there may not have actually been the 
sea change in legal context to merit overriding the issue-preclusive effect of 
Repsis.”
141
 Under this rationale, Herrera would be precluded from bringing 
                                                                                                             
 133. Id. at 1706 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 134. Compare Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1694 (“[T]his case is controlled by Mille Lacs, not 
Race Horse”), with Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1707–08 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 1707 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 136. Id. at 1707–08 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 137. Id. at 1708 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 
(1896). 
 138. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1708 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. United States–Crow Treaty — Federal Indian Law — Indian Plenary Power 
Doctrine — Herrera v. Wyoming, 133 HARV. L. REV. 402, 406 (2019) [hereinafter Indian 
Plenary Power Doctrine].  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
418 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
 
any challenge against the state since he is bound by the prior Tenth Circuit 
judgment in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis.
142
 
Taking it a step further, Justice Alito contended that, even if the change-
in-law exception applied to issue preclusion based on Mille Lacs’ apparent 
reversal of Race Horse, Herrera was alternatively precluded by Repsis 
based on the “unoccupied” portion of the Repsis opinion.
143
 The dissent 
disagreed with the majority’s choice to brush this conclusion aside, and 
reasoned that this “independently sufficient ground” of the Repsis holding 
acts with the same force as the primary holding referred to by the 
majority.
144
 This disagreement highlights the different Restatement of 
Judgments approaches to issue preclusion when the case at issue contains 
more than one holding.
145
 The dissent favored the approach found in the 
First Restatement of Judgments, which states that “a judgment based on 
alternative grounds ‘is determinative on both grounds, although either alone 
would have been sufficient to support the judgment.’”
146
 On the contrary, 
the majority favored the Second Restatement’s approach, which states that 
“a judgment based on the determination of two independent issues ‘is not 
conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone.’”
147
 
Put simply, the dissent believed that, in this instance, “each conclusion 
provide[d] an independent basis for preclusion,”
148
 while the majority 
believed that a change in the legal context of either would warrant applying 
the exception to issue preclusion.
149
 An in-depth look at the details of the 
dissent highlight the significance of Justice Gorsuch’s vote, discussed in 
Part IV of this Note. Part III, however, will briefly examine the merits of 
counterarguments in favor of the state. 
III. The Case for Statehood Preemption and Looking Towards the Future 
As Jefferson Keel, President of the National Congress of American 
Indians, reiterated, the Herrera decision “affirm[s] that treaty rights are the 
supreme law of the land, and they continue in perpetuity unless expressly 
                                                                                                             
 142. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1709 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 1710 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 146. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1942)).  
 147. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 
1982)). 
 148. Id. at 1711 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 149. Id. at 1697–98.  
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repealed by an act of Congress.”
150
 This tribal-friendly approach echoes the 
original canons of construction found in landmark cases like Worcester v. 
Georgia and the rest of the Marshall Trilogy.
151
 These cases read much like 
Herrera: requiring clear congressional intent to extinguish treaty rights with 
high deference to the tribes. As discussed in Part I, supra, the early case of 
Ward v. Race Horse played a seminal role in establishing more state-
friendly approaches to treaty interpretation that would be followed for more 
than a century.
152
 This shift away from tribal deference to state deference 
heavily impacted tribal rights over the years, until cases like Mille Lacs and 
Cougar Den were decided.  
 “Plenary power” approaches like statehood preemption are not without 
their own merits. While these approaches see tribal authority as more 
“conditional” and “premised on the more absolute sovereignty of the United 
States,”
153
 they also take into account the ability of state governments to 
regulate themselves unburdened by treaties made by the federal 
government. This is especially true when usufructuary rights are at issue.
154
 
The question inevitably becomes whether the idea of statehood preemption 
actually stands in contrast to the original canons of construction laid out by 
the Marshall Court. For example, the Race Horse Court, after examining a 
treaty identical to the one in Herrera, found the language “temporary and 
precarious” in nature;
155
 thus, the Court deemed the treaty right expendable 
as originally understood by the drafters. The canons of construction laid out 
in the Marshall Trilogy are employed by “giv[ing] the benefit of doubt to 
Indians.”
156
 While initially it may seem likely that a court like the Race 
Horse Court would fail to defer to the tribes, as the dissent in Herrera 
                                                                                                             
 150. NCAI Applauds the U.S. Supreme Court’s Opinion Issued in Herrera v. 
Wyoming, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS (May 20, 2019), http://www.ncai.org/news/ 
articles/2019/05/20/ncai-applauds-the-u-s-supreme-court-s-opinion-issued-in-herrera-v-
wyoming. 
 151. These cases include Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 
1 (1831). 
 152. 163 U.S. 504 (1896). 
 153. Indian Plenary Power Doctrine, supra note 141, at 406. 
 154. See, e.g., Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686. 
 155. Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 514–16.  
 156. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of 
States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 267 
(2001).  
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contended, the balance may simply have fallen the other way based on the 
originalist interpretation of the treaty in question.
157
 
In the words of the late former Justice Antonin Scalia, the plenary power 
approaches are characterized as determining “what the current state of 
affairs ought to be.”
158
 This was the mindset long espoused by the 
Rehnquist Court in the 1980s and 1990s.
159
 Dubbed the “subjectivist 
approach” by some,
160
 it has been heavily criticized and seems to have been 
abandoned by a majority of the Court today, as seen in Herrera. But just 
how far Herrera reaches is unclear; this Note will now examine its 
implications.  
IV. The Boundaries of the Herrera Decision, or the Lack Thereof 
As noted previously,
161
 prior to Herrera, in Washington State Dept. of 
Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., Justice Gorsuch sided with the liberal wing 
of the Court and decided in favor of the Yakama Tribe after analyzing the 
original interpretation of the clause in question.
162
 In Herrera, Gorsuch 
again departed from the conservative wing of the Court and became the 
decisive fifth vote in favor of the Crow Tribe.
163
 When comparing a case 
like Herrera to a case like Repsis, it becomes clear that either case could 
have easily gone the opposite way. Notably, when analyzing the reasoning 
of both the majority and dissent in Herrera, it appears the majority had to 
fight tooth and nail to reach a conclusion in favor of the Crow Tribe. This is 
because, under issue preclusion, “a fundamental precept of common-law 
adjudication is that an issue once determined by a competent court is 
conclusive.”
164
 The majority applied a legitimate exception to the doctrine 
in order to give Herrera his day in court, but, as the dissent noted, the 
reasoning was somewhat attenuated since the Mille Lacs decision did not 
                                                                                                             
 157. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1703 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s 
interpretation of the treaty “debatable”).  
 158. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of 
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (1996) (quoting 
Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Apr. 4, 1990)) 
(emphasis added).  
 159. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 
492 U.S. 408 (1989).  
 160. See Getches, supra note 156, at 268.  
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 75–77. 
 162. See Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 163. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686.  
 164. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619 (1983).  
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explicitly overturn Race Horse.
165
 Moreover, the Repsis decision was based 
on alternative holdings, one of which was not reliant on the Race Horse 
decision.
166
 
A key drawback of the Herrera decision is that the dissent mostly 
discussed issue preclusion without reaching the interpretation question 
explicitly. Justice Alito did refer to the majority’s interpretation as 
“debatable,” but not necessarily erroneous.
167
 In the coming years, the 
Court will likely deal with more disputes like those in Herrera, and we will 
hopefully see where each justice stands on actual treaty interpretation rather 
than legal obstacles like issue preclusion. What is important to take away 
from Herrera, however, is how far the majority was willing to go to find for 
the Crow Tribe rather than the State of Wyoming.  
The Herrera decision ultimately foreshadows a “hopeful shift back 
toward the foundational principles of Federal Indian law that have suffered 
under the plenary power doctrine.”
168
 Following the departure of numerous 
justices after the Mille Lacs decision and prior to cases like Cougar Den, 
the Court’s stance in the Roberts era was shrouded in mystery in the context 
of treaty interpretation. Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Cougar Den 
displayed his approach to treaty interpretation generally. His vote with the 
majority in Herrera displayed his deference to the tribes. The question 
becomes, however, whether such deference reaches further than hunting 
rights on unoccupied land, or if it remains limited.  
Because the Herrera decision was not an easy one for the Court, it seems 
tribal deference is strong on the current Supreme Court after remaining a 
mystery in recent years. Justice Gorsuch may have originally been thought 
to side with the conservative bloc of justices on many issues, but tribal 
issues seem to be one with which he diverges. As a newer justice on the 
current Court, it will take more time to reveal his full stance on tribal issues. 
Neither in Cougar Den, nor in Herrera did the majority use any language 
that would limit its analysis to usufructuary rights cases. Put simply, the 
majority in both cases approached treaty interpretation with an originalist 
lens, giving the tribes the benefit of the doubt whenever possible. 
According to Justice Gorsuch, the goal is to interpret the language in a way 
“most consistent with the treaty’s original meaning.”
169
 
                                                                                                             
 165. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1707–08 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 166. Id. at 1709 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 167. Id. at 1703 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 168. Indian Plenary Power Doctrine, supra note 141, at 406. 
 169. Washington State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016 
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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V. Conclusion 
In short, tribal treaty rights—not simply usufructuary ones—are 
currently the safest they have ever been. Recent developments in case law 
and turnover on the Supreme Court have all but solidified a strong majority 
favoring tribal deference in treaty disputes. While the shift away from 
plenary power approaches began with cases like Mille Lacs, it was not until 
Herrera v. Wyoming that Americans got a glance into what seems like a 
bright future for Native American tribes. The path to its ultimate conclusion 
in favor of the Crow Tribe demonstrates the majority’s apparent goal in 
treaty disputes: to analyze treaties with an originalist lens, ascertain the 
intent of both parties, and extinguish tribal treaty rights only when the 
congressional intent to do so is clear and unambiguous. 
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